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Abstract
The main goal of this work is to propose the design of secret shar-
ing schemes based on hard-on-average problems. It includes the descrip-
tion of a new multiparty protocol whose main application is key manage-
ment in networks. Its unconditionally perfect security relies on a discrete
mathematics problem classified as DistNP-Complete under the average-
case analysis, the so-called Distributional Matrix Representability Prob-
lem. Thanks to the use of the search version of the mentioned decision
problem, the security of the proposed scheme is guaranteed. Although
several secret sharing schemes connected with combinatorial structures
may be found in the bibliography, the main contribution of this work is
the proposal of a new secret sharing scheme based on a hard-on-average
problem, which allows to enlarge the set of tools for designing more secure
cryptographic applications.
Keywords: Cryptography, Secret Sharing, Matrices, Computational
Complexity.
AMS classifications: 94A60, 94A62.
1 Introduction
When a group of nodes in an open network wants to use standard security
services such as authentication, confidentiality or data integrity, they usually
have to share a common secret piece of information called session key. In order
to build a highly secure key management service in wireless ad hoc networks,
threshold cryptography based on secret sharing schemes has been yet proposed
in the literature [16]. Since the standard approach of replication is not suitable
for these particularly vulnerable networks, the distribution of trust among the
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set of nodes seems to be the most robust solution. In this work, a new secret
sharing scheme is proposed in order to increase the security level of known secret
sharing schemes by basing them on hard-on-average problems.
When choosing a specific problem as basis of a cryptographic application,
one of the most important characteristics we have to look for is that, on the one
hand, finding a solution must not be computationally feasible, whereas on the
other hand, generating pairs formed by (instance, solution) can be efficiently
accomplished. Another usual property of the selected problem is that the veri-
fication procedure for any solution should be as simple as possible.
The previous reasons justify the widespread use of problems belonging to
the worst-case NP and NP − complete classes in the area of the design of
cryptographic applications. However, NP-completeness only guarantees that
there is no polynomial-time algorithm to solve a problem in the worst case.
Furthermore, with the development of the Computational Complexity Theory,
and concretely thanks to the advances made on the Average-Case analysis, it has
been proved that many NP-complete problems may be efficiently solved when
the instance is randomly generated [9]. So, our proposal to solve this problem is
to choose as base problems those whose difficulty is guaranteed by the average-
case analysis. In this paper, the first (to the knowledge of the authors) secret
sharing scheme based on a problem catalogued as NP-complete from the point
of view of the average-case analysis is proposed. The problem that has been
chosen as base for the protocol proposed here is the so-called Distributional
Matrix Representability Problem [15], which is hard-on-average.
The structure of the present work is as follows. The next section discusses
the underlying problem in the framework of average-case complexity whereas
Section 3 locates the proposal in the existing context of Secret Sharing. The
proposed scheme is described in detail in section 4. Finally, several conclusions
and open problems close the paper.
2 The Underlying Problem
The average-case analysis is based on the concept of distributional decision prob-
lem [11], which is formed by a decision problem and a probability distribution
defined on the set of instances. In this context, the choice of the probability
distribution plays an important role since to fix a probability distribution could
directly influence the practical complexity of the problem. In fact, it has been
proved the existence of NP-complete problems solvable in polynomial time when
the instances are randomly generated under certain distributions.
The distributional class analogous to NP in the hierarchy associated to the
average-case analysis is the DistNP class. It is formed by pairs containing a
decision problem belonging to the NP class and a polynomially computable
probability distribution. As in worst-case complexity theory, a distributional
problem is said to be average-case NP-complete (or DistNP-complete) if it is in
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DistNP and every distributional problem in DistNP is reducible to it. The first
problem catalogued as DistNP-complete was the distributional tiling problem,
whose formal proof of membership may been found in [11]. Later, a few works
containing the description of new average-case NP-complete problems have been
published [14], [13], [6], [15].
The main difficulty when trying to use problems belonging to this category in
practical applications is the artificiality of their specifications. So, the principal
reason why we have chosen the Distributional Matrix Representability Problem
as base for the Secret Sharing Scheme here proposed is its naive formulation.
The original Distributional Matrix Representability Problem can be roughly
defined in the following way. All the matrices in the problem are square and
with integer entries. Given an r × r matrix A and a set of matrices with the
same size {A1, A2, ..., Ak}, it should be decided whether A can be expressed as
a product of matrices in the given set.
In the present work a bounded version of such a problem for 20×20 matrices
is proposed to be used. In this case the instance consists of a matrix A, a set
of k distinct matrices {A1, A2, ..., Ak} and a positive integer n ≤ k, and the
question to answer may be stated as follows: is it possible to express A as
a product of n matrices belonging to the set {A1, A2, ..., Ak}. This bounded
version of the problem was shown to be average-caseNP-complete by Venkatesan
and Rajagopalan [14]. The distribution considered to generate the integers k
and n and the integer entries of the matrices is the uniform distribution.
The proposed scheme uses the search version of the above distributional
problem, which consists in finding n matrices in {A1, A2, ..., Ak} whose product
is A. The difficulty of such a version is equivalent to that of the original distribu-
tional decision problem as may be deduced from the general result stated in [1],
according to which, search and decision distributional problems are equivalent
from the average-case analysis point of view.
3 Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing multiparty protocols solve usual practical situations where it is
necessary the distribution of a particular secret A among a set of users M .
Such a context may be illustrated with the problem of secret key management.
The main objective of Secret Sharing Schemes is to guarantee that only pre-
designated subsets of participants are able to reconstruct the secret by collec-
tively combining their shares (or shadows) of A. The specification of all the
subsets of participants which are authorized to recreate the secret is called the
access structure of the Secret Sharing Scheme. An access structure is said to be
monotone if any set which contains a subset that can recover the secret can itself
recover the secret. A general methodology to design Secret Sharing Schemes for
arbitrary monotone access structure was given in [2] and [7] . However, such
results were not useful for the Secret Sharing Scheme proposed here because the
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access structure is not monotone.
The first secret sharing schemes were independently proposed in 1979 [3],
[12]. Later it was demonstrated that both proposals can be considered de-
scribed in a common general scheme due to their basis on the same principles
of linear algebra, [10]. Many different mathematical structures such as poly-
nomials, geometric configurations, block designs, Reed-Solomon codes, vector
spaces, matroids, complete multipartite graphs, orthogonal arrays and Latin
squares have been used to model secret sharing schemes. The scheme here de-
scribed is based on the generation of a secret matrix as product of matrices with
the same size. Another scheme based also in matrices was proposed in [8], but
there the secret is a solution to a system of linear equations.
In general, the structure of most Secret Sharing Schemes is based on two
phases. In the initialization phase, a third trusted party called the dealer, dis-
tributes shares of the secret to authorized participants through a secure channel.
In the reconstruction phase, the authorized participants of a subset in the access
structure combine their shares to reconstruct the secret. In the initialization of
the Secret Sharing Scheme proposed here the dealer will publish all the shares
and the only secret information that is revealed to each participant is a pointer
to a concrete share and the names of the other parties in the same access struc-
ture.
Secret sharing schemes which do not reveal any information about the shared
secret to unauthorized individuals are called perfect. On the other hand, a
concept extensively used in Secret Sharing Schemes is the unconditional security
of perfect schemes. A Secret Sharing Scheme is considered unconditionally
secure against cheaters if the probability of successfully cheating does not depend
on the computational abilities of the cheaters. The Secret Sharing Scheme
proposed in the following Section is perfect and unconditionally secure.
4 A Secret Sharing Scheme Based on an Average-
Case Intractable Problem
In the following secret sharing scheme, the participation of a Third Trusted
Party is only necessary during the first off-line initialization stage of the gener-
ation of the secret.
Since within the protocol many products of matrices have to be carried out, it
is advisable that all those products are carried out using the algorithm proposed
in [4] due to its efficiency. On the other hand, the Monte Carlo algorithms
described by Freivalds [5] for the verification of the product of two matrices
may be used to achieve the fraud detection process. The error probability in
these algorithms is bounded by 2−t, where t is the number of iterations to be
performed.
In order to simplify the general description of the protocol it will be split
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into two phases: Initialization and Reconstruction.
4.1 Initialization
This set-up stage consists of the generation of the secret, task that is equivalent
to the generation of an instance of the underlying problem. It should be carried
out privately by the Third Trusted Party.
It starts with the random generation of two integers k and n such that n ≤ k,
where n indicates the number of participants.
Then, k 20 × 20 matrices Ai, i = 1, . . . , k with integer entries are randomly
generated. All the matrices form a public set denoted byM and are identified by
indices of their positions in this set. An ordered subset of n matrices constitutes
the access structure and their product, A, is the secret information.
In this phase the existence of a secure communication channel is necessary
because each authorized participant has to learn from the Third Trusted Party
which is his or her secret shadow in M , and who is his or her neighbor in the
product ordering. The main problem of this stage is usually the bandwidth
necessary to transfer the shadows. However, such a difficulty is here avoided
by sending to each authorized participant user only the index pointing to the
corresponding matrix in the access structure.
Finally, the Third Trusted Party sends to the i-th participant a random bi-
nary vector Ui with Hamming weight greater than 1 and the same dimension
that the matrices intervening in the protocol. The corresponding product vec-
tors between these random vectors and the secret matrix A, U ′
i
= A · Ui, are
then published. In this way, each pair of vectors Ui and U
′
i
is only available to
i-th participant, who cannot obtain the secret A from such information since
both vectors define a system of 20 linear equations in 400 unknowns.
4.2 Reconstruction
This stage begins with a verification that allows the following two things: De-
tect the presence of cheaters among the shadow holders, and guarantee the
correctness of the secret construction.
In order to allow the verification step, the n different circular shifts of the
original order of the participants set {P(i), P(i+1), . . . , P(i+n−1)} (where all the
sub-indices are (mod (n + 1)) are considered. Such shifts establish the order
in which the verification is developed. The participant designated in first place
according to the shift (P(i)) computes the product between his or her shadow and
the random binary vector Ui obtaining A(i)Ui, then he or she sends the obtained
result to the next participant (P(i+1)) determined by the permutation. In this
way, P(i+1) computes the product determined by his or her shadow and the
vector provided by P(i), (A(i+1)A(i)Ui), and so on. Only if all the participants
have been honest, the last participant obtains U ′
i
. After comparing it with the
published vector, he or she communicates the result of the verification to the
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others. According to this process, if some participant tries to forge his or her
shadow, the forgery is always detected by the last participant.
Once passed the verification stage, according to the same permutations as
before, each first participant Pi has to choose randomly a secret integer 20× 20
matrix Xi and to reveal publicly the product between his or her shadow and Xi
to the following user. The receiver multiplies his or her shadow by the received
information and sends the result to the following user, and so on. Finally, the
last participant has to give what he or she received to the first user, who will be
able to recover the secret from A(i−1)A(i−2) · · ·A1AnAn−1 · · ·AiXi. In order to
do it, he or she has to multiply such a matrix by (AnAn−1 · · ·AiXi)
−1 by the
right, and by (AnAn−1 · · ·AiXi)(Xi)
−1 by the left.
4.3 Comments
The main parameter of secret sharing schemes is the number of necessary par-
ticipants to recover the secret, known as the cardinality of the privilege users
in the access structure. In the proposed scheme, such a number, denoted by n,
must be large enough to avoid that an exhaustive search attack may be suc-
cessful. With respect to this point, note that in the original description of the
scheme it is assumed that n <20 so that the participants cannot find A without
executing the algorithm. In general, for any number of participants n, the size
of matrices should be r > n in order to guarantee the security of the scheme.
On the other hand, since the search space for the exhaustive search is
formed by all possible products of n matrices in the set M , and has cardi-
nality
(
k + n− 1
n
)
, the number k should also be well chosen. The integer x
is another important parameter that should be randomly selected in order to
guarantee the security of the system.
Within the generation of the vector U the binary vectors with Hamming
weight 1 should be discarded, because otherwise the vector U ′ will coincide with
a column of the secret matrix A. Thus, the cardinality of the set of possible
binary vectors is 220 − 20.
The security of the proposed scheme is guaranteed by the difficulty of the
distributional matrix representability problem because any unauthorized indi-
viduals only know the public set of k matrices {A1, A2, ..., Ak} and a positive
integer n ≤ k, and from that knowledge they cannot guess which is the subset
that produces the secret A. On the other hand, if the size of matrices is r > n,
any group of less than n authorized individuals only know a part of the sub-
set that produces A, and have not enough information to find the remaining
matrices.
The described procedure allows to carry out a secure multiparty computation
of the secret information without revealing any valuable information about the
shared secret to unauthorized individuals, so the scheme is perfect. Also, the
proposed scheme is unconditionally secure because the probability of successfully
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cheating does not depend on the computational abilities of the cheaters. On
the other hand, the distribution of computation among all the participants is
balanced, which turn them into ideal candidates as primitive tools for designing
key management schemes in wireless ad hoc networks.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a secret sharing scheme based on an average-
case NP-complete problem, the so-called distributional matrix representability
problem. The proposal does not reveal any valuable information about the
shared secret matrix to unauthorized parties, and the size of each share equals
the size of the secret, so the scheme is ideal. Also, since the distribution of
computation among all the participants is balanced, the proposal seems a useful
primitive for defining a key management protocol in wireless ad hoc networks.
The study of concrete constructions of difficult instances of the problem that
are adequate according to the design of the scheme is part of a work in progress.
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